Why ISO 15118 Was Built

▶ Watch (02:57)

600 million electric vehicles by 2040 means 30 to 40% of the global fleet. That volume creates two grid problems: too many vehicles charging at once trips local transformers, and renewable surpluses push grid frequency outside safe limits. Spain in April 2025 lost its entire national grid for 48 hours because a surplus had no fast enough response.

Electric vehicles are parked 95% of the time. Smart charging lets stations pull power only when the grid allows. V2G lets parked EVs absorb surplus and push it back on demand. ISO 15118 is the standard enabling both, in two versions: 15118-2 (2014) and 15118-20 (2022, full V2G).

What the Standard Actually Secures

▶ Watch (09:13)

ISO 15118 secures the EV-to-charger link through plug and charge. The vehicle stores a PKI-issued digital certificate tied to the user’s account. When plugged in, the charger reads it automatically, handles authentication, and pulls payment data over TLS. RFID cards and credit cards (previously stolen, skimmed, or cloned) are no longer in the loop.

Payment responsibility also shifts from individual chargers to a centralized e-mobility service provider (EMSP). A single charger breach once exposed hundreds of owners. An EMSP breach could expose millions, but the architecture is still stronger than the prior fragmented setup where some chargers had no security policies at all.

The Threats the Standard Leaves Open

▶ Watch (14:22)

The standard covers only the EV-to-charger communication link and explicitly leaves charger hardware out of scope.

“the standard assumes that the charging station is a trusted entity that the charging station is secure and this is a an assumption that can backfire” — Salvatore Gariuolo

Recent audits found chargers running Raspberry Pi hardware with open debug ports and unsecured remote access. A compromised charger can deny service, push power above the negotiated safe level (no compliance enforcement exists), or accept expired certificates by resetting the local clock. The standard has no requirement to sync with a trusted time source.

Grid-Scale Attack Paths Enabled by Smart Charging

▶ Watch (18:47)

Smart charging and V2G are the standard’s headline features. Both become attack vectors once a charger is compromised. A compromised station can simulate grid congestion, inflate prices, and stop all connected EVs from charging. The owner returns to a dead battery.

The larger threat targets the local power transformer. Multiple compromised stations synchronized to rapid charge-discharge cycles can push grid frequency outside safe limits. Gariuolo pointed to Spain’s April 2025 blackout (48 hours, caused by an unintentional frequency shift from a renewable surplus) as the benchmark. The same effect is reachable deliberately, given enough budget and control of enough chargers.

Notable Quotes

the standard assumes that the charging station is a trusted entity that the charging station is secure and this is a an assumption that can backfire Salvatore Gariuolo · ▶ 14:47

true security is not simply complying with a standard Salvatore Gariuolo · ▶ 22:13

often new risks of vulnerability emerge in the gaps that no one is looking at Salvatore Gariuolo · ▶ 22:47

Key Takeaways

  • ISO 15118 closes RFID skimming and card theft but leaves charging station hardware entirely out of scope.
  • A compromised charger can accept revoked certificates via clock manipulation, reopening the fraud vector the standard was meant to close.
  • V2G-enabled chargers, synchronized across a local transformer, can artificially shift grid frequency and trigger a blackout.